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I. Introduction
Imagine a world without peer-to-peer (P2P) technology. For some,
this would be a welcome change. As the argument often goes, P2Ps are
tools for infringement, so they should be outlawed. Had this logic
prevailed in earlier times, we would live in a world without computers,
VCRs, Xerox machines, blank cassette tapes, musical instruments,
writing instruments, or even paper. All these items have two things in
common: (1) they may be used as tools for copyright infringement, and
(2) they were, at one point in time, revolutionary innovations. If
copyright law had operated in the past to stifle innovation, where would
the world be now?
Since 1976, copyright law has undergone fundamental changes,
beginning with the revised Copyright Act and extending to the advent of
digital technologies. These changes have forced us to reexamine
copyright and determine how best to promote copyright's fundamental
goals in the digital age. As new technologies emerge and terms of
copyright protection extend, innovation works its way into the debate.
Until now, innovation has been primarily a concern of patent law.
However, with the new dynamics of copyright law, copyright owners
may stifle innovation in ways never before contemplated. The purpose
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of this article is to advocate an appropriate balance where copyright
owners receive adequate returns on their investment without stifling
innovation, thus promoting not only innovation but the original tenets of
copyright. This article will take a comprehensive approach, beginning
with the Founders' intentions when drafting the Copyright Clause. Part
II analyzes the principles of copyright. Part III discusses the implied
rights of copyright that exist separate from the enumerated rights. Part
IV presents the ideals of consumerism and how consumers should
interact with copyrighted works. Part V analyzes the development of the
fair use doctrine. Part VI discusses innovative mediums and argues that
development of innovative mediums is a separate interest that copyright
seeks to promote. Part VII examines the dangers of expanding secondary
liability to innovators. Part VIII discusses the recent case involving the
ReplayTV 4000. Finally, Part IX presents the innovative medium
defense, a new doctrine to analyze liability of innovative mediums.
Throughout these sections two major underlying themes will flow. First,
copyright law fosters innovation of new mediums. Second, recent
changes in copyright law permit copyright owners to stifle innovation.
These themes represent a disruption in the balance of copyright law that
needs to be restored.
II. Principles of Copyright
Before exploring the complex dynamics between copyright
protection and fair use in the digital age, it is necessary to reexamine the
Founders' view of the copyright power that they vested in Congress.1
The Constitution grants Congress the power to promote the useful arts.
2
It is important to understand that the Copyright Clause is a may provision
rather than a shall provision. Congress could have just as easily chosen
to ignore copyright, but instead chose to act upon this power through a
series of legislative initiatives.3  These initiatives illustrate one
fundamental concept: copyright owners are granted a limited right for a
limited term.4  "What is protected is not so much the right of the
copyright holder to exploit the work as the right of the people of the
United States to learn from it."'5 Therefore, copyright may be viewed as
a secondary constitutional grant. It is a right directly bestowed upon
1. Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the
Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article L Section 8,
Clause 8 of The U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 911 (2003).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831); Copyrights
Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (2003); Copyrights Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
4. Joyce & Patterson, supra note 1, at 938.
5. Id. at 940.
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neither copyright owners nor consumers. Rather, the essence of
copyright law is to advance three fundamental principles: (1) the
promotion of learning, (2) the provision of public access, and (3) the
protection of the public domain.6
Copyright law operates to promote these principles by granting
individual rights for individual works. These rights provide authors with
incentives to create new works. Once the work is created, authors have
no obligations to promote the principles of copyright. Instead, the
principles are promoted through proper use of these new works by
consumers. Doctrines such as fair use exist to permit proper use by
consumers. Thus, copyright law as a whole has the burden of promoting
the three fundamental principles of its existence. This is just, for
authors' obligations should be restricted to the creation of works.
However, changes in copyright law have changed the way individual
authors can affect the overall balance of copyright.
A. Incentives for Prolonged Enforcement
Copyright protection now extends for the life of the author plus 70
years.7 Many scholars were troubled by this extension of copyright
protection. 8 These concerns are justified. It is hard to imagine how
extending rights 70 years beyond the author's death incentivizes the
author to create a work. Nevertheless, beyond this incentive issue is a
more pressing concern. The policy of copyright is to create the next
work. 9 The next work comes in two forms. First, we want Author A to
produce Work A. Hopefully, Author B will read Work A and produce
Work B. Second, if no author can (or will) improve upon Author A's
work, we want Author A to produce subsequent works.
The issue of prolonged enforcement works two problems on the
copyright scheme. First, current owners have more incentives to
dedicate resources to protect existing works than to create future works.
With more limited terms of copyright protection, these resources would
6. Id. at 946.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2003).
8. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CENTRAL CREATIVITY (2004);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power,
and the Constitution: Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the
Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002); Hon. Hank
Brown & David Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Sapping American Creativity, 44 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 94 (1996); Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the
Constitution: "Have I Stayed Too Long?" 52 FLA. L. REV. 989 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg
et al., The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long? 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651 (2000).
9. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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be redirected to the creation of new works. Second, prolonged copyright
enforcement is purging the public domain. Future authors have an
incredibly limited pool of free works to use in creating new works. 10
These are serious problems that threaten the delicate fabric of copyright.
B. Paradigmatic Shift in Copyright Protection
A paradigmatic shift has drastically altered the course of copyright.
Works of entertainment certainly have their place within the blanket of
copyright protection. However, entertainment works have taken a
dominant position in the realm of copyright. The copyright industry,
comprised mostly of entertainment works, now accounts for 5.24% of the
United States' GDP." Such dominance has facilitated a paradigmatic
shift from promoting the useful arts to maximizing the profitability of the
entertainment industry. These are two fundamentally distinct goals. The
purpose of copyright has always been to provide adequate profitability to
ensure the creation of new works. But when the focus shifts to
vigorously protecting existing works, copyright moves away from its
traditional purpose.
The entertainment industries were built on a business model that
derives high margins from the sale of physical products.12 This model is
"incompatible with the economics of digital distribution.' ' 13 Thus, the
entertainment industry has fought digitalized distribution models,
claiming uncertainty as to security for their copyrighted works.
14
However, it is apparent that the entertainment industry is seeking to
firmly entrench existing business models in the digital age. 15 Curtailing
copyright policy to the needs of its dominant owners shifts the focus of
copyright from its prescribed goals to the promotion of existing business
models. 16 Unfortunately, we have witnessed this shift in recent court
decisions. In the wake of the entertainment industry's legal assault,
courts have become consumed with the protection of existing works. By
10. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 21-24 (describing how Walt Disney developed cartoons
from previous works available in the public domain).
11. Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries
of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, n. 104 (2004).
12. Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and
Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 490 (2002).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 490-91.
15. Id. at 491; see generally Brodi Kemp, Copyright's Digital Reformulation, 5
YALE J.L. & TECH. 42 (2003); Masanobu Katoh, Anti-Circumvention Measures, License
Restrictions, and the Scope of IP Protection: Protection From Copying or Protection
From Competition?: Intellectual Property and the Internet: A Japanese Perspective,
2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 333 (2002).
16. Fagin et al., supra note 12, at 491.
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doing so, courts have lost sight of the original goals of copyright as set
forth by the Founders. This problem can be corrected, but first it is
necessary to examine copyright in its entirety, from exclusive rights to
implied rights.
III. The Implied Rights of Copyright
A copyright provides its owner with the exclusive rights of
reproduction, distribution, derivative works, performance, and display of
the copyrighted work.1 7 These rights are relatively clear as plenty of
litigation and legislative actions have sought to identify these rights.
Often the misunderstanding exists that these are the only rights embodied
in copyrighted works. That is not the case. Copyright is a social contract
rather than just a right granted to authors.1 8 Like any other contract,
copyright calls for mutual rights and obligations on the part of both
owners and consumers. For example, owners have the right to enforce
the rights enumerated in the Copyright Act. However, they also have the
obligation not to seek copyright enforcement for ideas. On the other
hand, consumers have the right to use ideas as freely as they wish. They
have the obligation not to infringe upon the enumerated rights under the
Copyright Act.
The specifically enumerated rights of owners also give rise to
implied rights. Some of these implied rights vest in owners, while others
vest in consumers. These implied rights have not received the same
attention as the enumerated rights. For example, commentators have
opined that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act creates a new right of
access. 19 However, controlling access is not a new concept. ° Content
owners cannot profit from their copyrighted works without making the
works available. Consequently, it was not necessary for the Founders or
Congress to expound upon access. Another reason for negligible
discussion of implied rights is the incorporation of implied rights under
the doctrine of fair use.2'
Nevertheless, implied rights are particularly important because of
the unique nature of copyrights as an asset. Typically, an asset is viewed
as a tangible object. Copyright is a bundle of exclusionary rights, not a
tangible object. Even when an author copyrights a book, the book is not
the copyright; rather, the copyright is the bundle of rights granted to the
author. The book is the copyrighted work. Often this distinction is moot
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003).
18. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Stop Mucking Up Copyright Law: A Proposal for a
Federal Common Law of Contract, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 1031 (2004).
19. See discussion infra Part III.D.
20. See discussion infra Part III.B.
21. See discussion infra Part V.
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and demands nominal analysis, but it is imperative to understanding
implied rights. Implied rights arise with regard to the copyrighted work,
namely how the work is made available by the author and how
consumers are permitted to use the work. Some of these implied rights
vest in authors while others vest in consumers.
A. Right ofAvailability
The Copyright Act gives owners the implied right of availability.
Owners are certainly free to choose not to make their works available to
the public. Consider an author who writes a poem. Once the poem is
fixed in a medium, the author holds a copyright in that poem. However,
the author has no duty to make the poem available to the public.
Copyright analysis has glossed over this implied right because of
copyright's economic roots. Operating on the assumption that the owner
needs economic incentives to create works, the only way to exercise the
enumerated rights is to make the work available to the public. The
author of the poem cannot reap economic benefit unless he or she sells or
licenses use of the poem. Consequently, the implied right of availability
is a weak implied right. That is, the owner gains no economic benefit
from exercising the right to exclude all uses of the work.
B. Limited Access and Limited Use
Digital economics has altered the traditional distribution model of
copyrighted works. Under the traditional model, the owner makes works
available at certain locations. Usually the owner sells or licenses works
to retailers, who then sell or license numerous works to end consumers.
Thus, consumers go to retailers and enjoy limited access to and limited
use of works.22 This is synonymous with skimming a book at a
bookstore or examining a painting at an art gallery to determine if you
want to purchase it. Limited access and limited use avoided scrutiny
because they were essential to the transaction between consumer and
content owner. Consumers look at paintings, skim books, and examine
maps before making a purchase. These implied rights were so
fundamental, the Copyright Act did not contemplate situations where the
consumer would have no access and no use prior to making a direct
payment to the owner. It was assumed the owner had to permit limited
access and limited use in order to derive economic benefit from the
copyright.
22. Another way to phrase this right in terms of the owner is that the owner has an
implied right of "controlled sampling."
2005]
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C. Autonomy
Autonomy is an implied right shared by owners and consumers.
From the consumer's standpoint, autonomy represents the "freedom in
choosing when, how, and under what circumstances to consume a
copyrighted work., 2 3 Consider the way the typical consumer reads a
book.2 4 Rarely will the consumer read the book from front to back in one
21sitting. Instead, the consumer reads portions of the book, returning to
finish his or her reading at a later date.26 Or consider a CD. The
consumer may want to listen to the entire CD at once, or only to certain
tracks. Additionally, the consumer will want to be able to listen to the
CD in the car, in the home, or even at work. Consumer autonomy may
even involve requisite levels of copying.27 For example, legal scholars
photocopy articles, make notes, and copy quotations in the process of
preparing their new works.28
Copyright owners also have an implied right in autonomy. Owners
want to control when, how, and to what extent consumers may exercise
autonomy. Certain copyrighted works provide more autonomy to the
owner, such as public performances and television broadcasts. 29 For
example, at one time movies offered copyright owners virtually complete
autonomy. Consumers could either see the full movie in the theatres, or
they could watch an edited version on television some years later. If they
did not see the movie in the few weeks it was in the theatres, they never
had a chance to see the full version again.
Consumer autonomy and owner autonomy share an inverse
relationship. This relationship gives rise to an interplay between
consumers and owners. Consumers seek to gain as much autonomy as
possible. Consumers find these autonomous gains in new mediums.
Owners, on the other hand, seek to retain as much autonomy as possible.
Owners maintain autonomy by stifling innovation and restricting
consumer behavior to existing business models.
Technological advances affect this interplay of autonomy between
consumers and owners.30  For example, the advent of VCRs and
videocassettes allowed consumers to see the full versions of movies after
they had finished their run at the theatre. More recently, technologies





27. Id. at 407.
28. Id.
29. Liu, supra note 23, at 408.
30. Id. at 409.
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like ReplayTV 400031 have granted consumers more autonomy than ever
when consuming television broadcasts. 32  Alternatively, copyright
owners may use digital technology to restrict consumer autonomy.33
Because digital technology can be used to enhance or restrict consumer
autonomy, it increases the complexity of the relationship between
consumers and copyrighted works.34  It follows that substantive
judgments must be made regarding consumer autonomy.35 Consumer
autonomy received protection in the pre-digital environment and should
continue to receive protection in the digital environment.3 6
D. Attacking Autonomy Via Anticircumvention
The passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was
supposedly necessary for the United States to fulfill its obligations set
forth in the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty.37
The DMCA "defines three separate species of anti-circumvention
violations-a basic provision, a ban on trafficking, and additional
violations. 38  The core provision sets forth that "No person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title."39 The statute hedges this provision with
numerous limitations.40 Additionally, the DMCA bans the trafficking of
devices that enable violations of the core provision.4' Finally, the
DMCA provides a sort of "savings provision. 4 2  According to this
provision, the DMCA will not affect fair use, nor enlarge secondary
liability.
43
These anticircumvention provisions find no constitutional or
statutory relationship to copyright.44  The DMCA permits owners to
extend copyright-like protection to material that cannot receive copyright
protection, but can be technologically protected.45 It is often argued the
DMCA creates "another set of rights altogether; a right to control access
31. See discussion infra Part VIII.
32. Liu, supra note 23, at 409.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 421.
35. Id. at 422.
36. Id.
37. Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1103 (2003).
38. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148
U. PA. L. REv. 673, 684 (2000).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2003).
40. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 684.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2003).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2003).
43. Id.
44. Burk, supra note 37, at 1109.
45. Id.
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to eligible works. 'A6 In fact, the anticircumvention provisions transcend
copyright law in such a way that many commentators refer to
anticircumvention as "paracopyright. ' '47 Prior to the DMCA, Congress
promoted the policy behind copyright by regulating the works subject to
copyright, not the devices through which copyrights are distributed.48 In
terms of implied rights, the DMCA severely alters the balance of implied
rights between owners and consumers.
1. Implications of the DMCA-A New Right of Access
Professor Burk voices the typical consumer's concern regarding the
DMCA: "[T]he DMCA anticircumvention provisions.., enable a new
form of exclusive right, a right of access. '49 The DMCA prohibits
circumvention even when the consumer's end goal is to use a
copyrighted work in a manner allowed under the Copyright Act.50 The
anticircumvention provisions extend copyright protection far beyond any
exclusive right listed in the Copyright Act.51  Most likely, the
anticircumvention provisions transcend Congress's power under the
Copyright Clause. Such a new right of access facilitates the "licensing
of access to unprotected materials."53 This can be viewed as granting
copyright owners an "ancillary property right in circumvention
technology," or in other words, "a property right in the means of
accessing content. 54
The most shocking consequence of the DMCA is how copyright
owners have employed the statute in the courts.55 Congress intended
anticircumvention to serve as a shield to protect works, not as a sword
for copyright owners to use in extending their monopolies to include
uncopyrighted technologies.56 In other words, the DMCA was supposed
46. Id.; see also Laura N. Gasway, The New Access Right and its Impact on
Libraries and Library Users, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269 (2003).
47. Burk, supra note 37, at 1109.
48. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 683.
49. Burk, supra note 37, at 1106.
50. Id. at 1107.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property:
Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697 (2003)
(arguing the DMCA is unconstitutional on a number of grounds); Note, Copyright Law-
District Court Holds That Website's Posting of and Linking to Code That Decrypts DVD
Copyright Protection Technology Violates Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 114 HARV.
L. REv. 1390 (2001); Jennifer L. Livingston, Free Speech and Fair Use: The DeCSS
Dilemma Resolved?, 71 U. IN. L. REV. 1117 (2003).
53. Burk, supra note 37, at 1109.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1135.
56. Id. at 1135-36.
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to help prevent mass copying and distribution,57 but cases involving the
DMCA are missing these elements. 58 In fact, these cases rarely involve
misappropriation of content that actually receives copyright protection.59
In RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 60 a preliminary injunction was
granted on grounds of DMCA violations. 61 "The most striking feature of
this opinion is that no content owner appears-although the DMCA was
purportedly enacted to protect owners of copyrighted content. 62 No
matter the true underpinnings behind the DMCA, its enforcement thus
far in the courts has been disturbing. Owners are using the DMCA to
enhance their implied rights and restrict consumer autonomy. After
numerous decisions, this balance of implied rights was finally analyzed
by the Federal Circuit.
63
2. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.
The technology involved in this case was Chamberlain's garage
door openers (GDOs). 64 Chamberlain's GDO utilized a rolling code
computer program that constantly changed the transmitter signal needed
to open the garage door.65 Chamberlain held a copyright for this
program.66 Skylink developed a universal transmitter that allowed users
to operate Chamberlain's GDOs.67  Chamberlain filed suit under the
DMCA, claiming Skylink's universal transmitter circumvented
Chamberlain's rolling code program.68 As the court took special note,
"Chamberlain has not alleged either that Skylink infringed its copyright
or that Skylink is liable for contributory copyright infringement.' 69
Unlike Napster, there was no mass infringement or distribution of
infringing goods involved in this case.70 And yet, Chamberlain's DMCA
claim was so broad that accepting Chamberlain's construction of the
57. Id. at 1136.
58. Id.
59. Burk, supra note 37, at 1110.
60. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
61. Burk, supra note 37, at 1111.
62. Id.
63. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
64. Id. at 1183.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1183-85.
68. Id. at 1183.
69. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1185.
70. Compare id., with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-12
(9th Cir. 2001) (Napster did not limit the number of files its customers could copy or
distribute).
2005]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
DMCA would have caused its own customers to be liable for
anticircumvention.71
The court upheld summary judgment in favor of Skylink and,
without using the term precisely, analyzed the DMCA in terms of
consumer autonomy. The court stated:
The essence of the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions is that
§§ 1201(a), (b) establish causes of action for liability. They do not
establish a new property right.... This distinction between property
and liability is critical. Whereas copyrights, like patents, are
property, liability protection from unauthorized circumvention
merely creates a new cause of action under which a defendant may be
liable.72
As the court noted, consumers have always been granted access to
copyrighted works; they just do not always have the right to copy such
works. 3 This distinction between a new property right and a new regime
of liability was important. Viewed as a new right, the DMCA would
fundamentally alter the landscape of copyright law.74
Chamberlain made the argument for a fundamental change in
copyright law, claiming the passage of the DMCA superseded all prior
consumer expectations of the legitimate use of products with copyrighted
software.7 5 The court was nothing short of outraged at this argument:
Under [Chamberlain's argument], the owners of a work protected by
both copyright and a technological measure that effectively controls
access to that work per § 1201(a) would possess unlimited rights to
hold circumventors liable under § 1201(a) merely for accessing that
work, even if that access enabled only rights that the Copyright Act
grants to the public.
76
Chamberlain actually argued that Congress intended to promote adequate
public access to copyrighted works by granting owners the right to deny
all access. 77 As the court pointed out, "such a redefinition borders on the
irrational. 78 Moreover, this assertion is impossible to balance with the
DMCA's "savings clause," which provides the DMCA will not "'affect
the rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses ... including fair use.' 79 If
71. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1187.
72. Id. at 1192-93.
73. Id. at 1193.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1200.
77. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1200.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see generally Kristin Brown, Digital Rights Management: Trafficking in
Technology That Can be Used to Circumvent the Intellectual Property Clause, 40 Hous.
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the DMCA prohibited all access without any regard to the rest of the
Copyright Act, then it certainly would affect rights and limitations, and
perhaps affect remedies and defenses, thereby violating Congressional
intent.80 The court even went so far as to claim Chamberlain's
interpretation of the DMCA would destroy fair use altogether:
Chamberlain's proposed construction would allow copyright owners
to prohibit exclusively fair uses even in the absence of any feared
foul use. It would therefore allow any copyright owner, through a
combination of contractual terms and technological measures, to
repeal the fair use doctrine with respect to an individual copyrighted
work-or even selected copies of that copyrighted work.
81
Referring to fair use, the court acknowledged consumers may "make
certain uses of copyrighted materials." 82 Thus, in its bid to have the
anticircumvention recognized as a separate right, Chamberlain managed
to convince the court to expand its view of fair use from a defense of
infringement to a right vested in consumers.83 Finally, the court set forth
the DMCA's relationship to the tenets of copyright:
The statutory structure and the legislative history both make it clear
that the DMCA granted copyright holders additional legal
protections, but neither rescinded the basic bargain granting the
public noninfringing and fair uses of copyrighted materials... . We
conclude that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that
bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright
Act otherwise affords copyright owners.
84
Contrary to the popular argument, the DMCA does not create a new
right of access for copyright owners. Instead, the DMCA permits owners
to exploit the value of making their works available to the public, while
at the same time constricting consumers' rights to limited access and
limited use of those works. Aside from restricting consumer autonomy,
the DMCA takes an even more drastic step in the relationship between
copyright owners and consumers. The DMCA, if enforced contrary to
Chamberlain, would prevent all consumer use not directly authorized by
the owner. Such prevention would violate the balance of copyright. The
promotion of useful arts requires consumer action; thus, if the DMCA
goes too far in preventing consumer action, it is an improper law. To
L. REv. 803 (2003); Ryan Roemer, Trusted Computing, Digital Rights Management, and
the Fight for Copyright Control on Your Computer, 2003 UCLA J.L. TECH. 8 (2003).
80. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1200.
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properly analyze the scope of the DMCA, it is necessary to thoroughly
examine the concept of the consumer as applied to copyright.
IV. The Ideals of Consumerism
After a copyrighted work becomes available, consumerism operates
to promote or damage the principles of copyright law. Innovative
mediums will magnify the effect of consumerism. Before addressing
liability standards for innovative mediums, it is imperative to analyze
consumers to understand what copyright law seeks to preserve. This
article poses two standards of consumerism: active consumerism and
passive consumerism. Active consumerism is subdivided into a positive
and negative form.
A. Positive Active Consumerism
Positive active consumerism was the original intent of the
Copyright Clause as society receives the most overall value through
active consumerism. 85  Positive active consumerism results when
consumers make desired uses of copyrighted works. The term "desired"
here means uses that serve the public. Positive active consumerism takes
several forms: subsequent authorship, creative self-expression,
commentary, and parody. American copyright law is rooted in the
concept of positive active consumerism. This is evident from the
numerous restrictions placed upon the scope of copyrights, such as the
first sale doctrine, the idea/expression dichotomy, and the inability to
copyright facts.
Digital technology expands the potential for positive active
consumerism, while at the same time increasing the potential impact of
positive active consumerism. 86 Technology, namely the Internet, lowers
the costs of communication. 87 Consumers are no longer limited by
geography for communicative consumption: a consumer in New York
can now send information to consumers in Los Angeles just as easily as
the consumer could send the same information to consumers in New
York.88 As a result, individual communicative consumption has the
potential to cause a greater effect on copyright incentives.
89
Communicative consumption by one consumer may now reach millions
of consumers and disrupt the balance of copyright between owners and
85. Liu, supra note 23, at 411-18.
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consumers. 90 Most importantly, positive active consumerism embraces
the development of innovative mediums. Promoting innovation is
discussed more thoroughly below.91 For now, it is only necessary to
acknowledge that copyright owners may stifle innovation by attacking
acts of positive active consumerism as negative active consumerism.
B. Negative Active Consumerism
Negative active consumerism constitutes undesirable uses made by
consumers. In this context, "undesirable" means uses that cause more
social harm than good. As discussed above, the Internet provides
individuals with a greater ability to affect the public. Much of this
discussion has been limited to how one infringer can cause substantial
economic damage to content owners. It is better to view this new
dynamic as the greater harm consumers can inflict on other consumers
by engaging in negative active consumerism. In other words, consumers
can now inflict more harm on other consumers than they could in the
pre-digital era. Negative active consumerism comes in two forms:
infringement and the appearance of impropriety.
Infringement harms the public in a number of ways. First, the
infringer is not adding anything new to the public domain; instead, the
infringer entirely or substantially copies from existing material.
Infringement thus goes against the spirit of copyright law, which is for
the public to receive a new work. Second, infringement increases the
costs of copyright enforcement. Content owners enforce their rights
through litigation, which consumes vast amounts of resources that could
otherwise be committed to the creation of new works. Third,
infringement leads to new laws expanding liability and copyright
protection.
Additionally, the appearance of impropriety can be just as harmful
as infringement to consumers. 92  Consider Universal City Studios v.
Corley,93 an anticircumvention case. Corley wrote a decryption program,
DeCSS, which was designed to crack CSS, the encryption technology
movie studios used to protect DVDs. 94 Corley posted DeCSS on his
90. Id.; see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir.
2001).
91. See discussion infra Part VI.
92. See generally Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political
Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1250-53 (2003) (opining that innovative
mediums concentrate the production of information, granting greater power to individual
consumers). If individual consumers have greater power in the creation of works, they
also have greater power (whether intentional or not) to negatively affect the creation of
new works and innovations.
93. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
94. Id. at 435-36.
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website. 95  Corley presented excellent arguments attacking the
constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. However,
Corley's website was an auxiliary of 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, a
hacker's magazine Corley had published since 1984.96 The court
highlighted this damning evidence:
While the magazine and the web site cover some issues of general
interest to computer users-such as threats to online privacy-the
focus of the publications is on the vulnerability of computer security
systems, and more specifically, how to exploit that vulnerability in
order to circumvent the security systems. Representative articles
explain how to steal an Intemet domain name and how to break into
the computer systems at Federal Express.
97
Corley's extensive history of promoting hacking cast a darkening
shadow over his arguments, no matter how justified they were. Worse,
his actions, which promoted the appearance of impropriety, helped
establish a harsh case law precedent in favor of owners that did not need
to exist.
The effects of negative active consumerism are even worse when
the underlying acts constitute infringement. Napster, whether intentional
or not, generated the appearance of impropriety similar to Corley. The
three damning facts for Napster were: (1) Napster only permitted the
transfer of music files, (2) almost all the music files traded remained
under copyright protection, and (3) Napster provided its users with
unlimited downloads and uploads.98 Yet Napster argued its services
constituted fair use.99 This makes fair use sound like an unsound
argument. Furthermore, it makes the road all the more difficult for future
developers of innovative technology to enhance consumer autonomy in
copyrighted works.
Perhaps it is better to think of appearance of impropriety as a cousin
of the clean hands doctrine. When technological providers develop an
innovative medium, they must take caution in how they promote that
medium. If their promotion advocates infringement, it is difficult for the
innovator to later argue fair use. The content industries have consistently
displayed their aggressive stance toward litigation. When a new medium
95. Id. at 435.
96. Id. at 439.
97. Id.
98. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
99. See id. at 1014. For a more thorough discussion of Napster, see Kevin M.
Lemley, Protecting Consumers From Themselves: Alleviating the Market Inequalities
Created by Online Copyright Infringement in the Entertainment Industry, 13 ALB. L.J.
Sci & TECH. 613, 624-28 (2003).
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is introduced, the content industries will sue.' 00  Consequently, all
promotional materials regarding the medium will become part of the
litigation record. Promotional statements such as "Stick it to the Man,"
or "We Don't Pay for Copyrighted Works" no doubt will increase
popularity of the innovative medium. However, these statements will
become part of the litigation record (most likely the second exhibit in the
complaint), and the battle to prove fair use will be a long, uphill fight.
C. Passive Consumerism
Passive consumerism involves consumers using the copyrighted
work in the manner intended by the copyright owner. With passive
consumerism, the copyrighted work is consumed as an ordinary good.'0 '
The consumer reads the book, watches the movie, or listens to the song;
the consumer does nothing more. No new works are created.10 2 The
passive consumer focuses on access to numerous copyrighted works at
reasonable cost.'0 3 Because the passive consumer engages in no active
transformation of copyrighted works, there is no need to analyze fair use
or desirable use.10 4  Copyright owners, namely the entertainment
industry, prefer passive consumerism. Passive consumers are
dependent-they never infringe and exercise fair use minimally. More
importantly, they do not create competing works. They enjoy only what
the industry says they will enjoy, and the industry dictates when and
where they can enjoy it. Thus, passive consumerism is perfect for
copyright owners in that it allows them to maximize profits; however, it
runs counter to the fundamental tenets of copyright.
Of particular importance to copyright owners, passive consumers do
not create innovative mediums. Owners are able to firmly entrench
existing business models without the threat of outside innovation. This is
exactly what the entertainment industry wants, but it is exactly what
copyright law seeks to prevent. If an innovative medium is more
efficient in recording and disseminating information, copyright law
mandates the introduction of this medium. Unfortunately, legislative
initiatives such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act advocate
passive consumerism. 0 5 With these developments, the fair use doctrine
cannot safeguard positive active consumerism in the development of
innovative mediums.
100. See, e.g., discussion infra Part VIII.
101. Liu, supra note 23, at 402.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 403.
105. Id at 403-04
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V. Fair Use
The purpose of granting copyrights to authors is to provide social
benefits to the public.'0 6 Fair use emerged as a balance between the
exclusionary rights granted to authors and the social benefits provided to
the public. Following this public-minded approach, application of the
fair use doctrine must incorporate a balancing of the public benefits and
losses that stem from copyright protection.107 For example, fair use helps
strike the balance between protection for authors and free speech. 108 The
Supreme Court has declared that "some opportunity for fair use of
copyrighted materials is necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ....
A. The Fair Use Factors
Fair use, which dates back to the 19th century, was originally a
product of judicial creation rather than legislative initiative. 10 Fair use
was finally added to the Copyright Act in 1976, but it was not precisely
defined. Under section 107, fair use "is not an infringement of
copyright.""' To determine if a use is a fair use, four factors must be
examined:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 
112
These factors are helpful in ascertaining what constitutes fair use.
But more intriguing is what the statute does not say. The statute
describes fair use as a limitation on the exclusive rights granted to
106. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REv. 975, 996 (2002) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
107. Id.
108. Chad Woodford, Trusted Computing or Big Brother: Putting the Rights Back in
Digital Rights Management, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 253, 266 (2004).
109. Id. at 266-67 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575
(1994)).
110. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
111. 17U.S.C.§ 107 (2003).
112. Id.
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authors. Further, fair use is not an infringement. What exactly does this
mean? Is fair use purely an affirmative defense to infringement, or is it a
form of statutory right granted to consumers? Until now, it has not been
necessary to make this distinction: copyright owners did not have the
means to exploit the availability of works while simultaneously denying
access to them. This has changed in the digital world. If fair use is a
right of consumers, then copyright owners are extending their
monopolies beyond their original grant. If fair use is only a defense, then
copyright owners are within their rights to limit access. It is thus
necessary to conduct a closer examination of the fair use doctrine,
including theories of why this doctrine was developed and what role it
should play in the digital age.
B. Market Failure Approach
In 1982, Professor Wendy Gordon published her classic article
describing fair use as a function of market failure.1 13 The market failure
approach suggests that fair use exists only because of the high
transaction costs of licensing." 4  Although the market failure theory
gained widespread acceptance among scholars, it reflects neither an
accurate interpretation of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,' 15 nor a sound application of economic principles.' 16 The
market failure approach has limited the full application of Sony. 1 7 As
Professor Lunney recently observed:
Properly understood, Sony stands not for the proposition that fair use
is justified only in those exceptional cases where a licensing scheme
or some other market mechanism is impractical. Rather, Sony stands
for the recognition of fair use as a central and vital arbiter between
two competing public interests.
118
"As the market failure interpretation of Sony has gained adherents,
the Court's own explanation of its decision has become marginalized."" 19
It was not until Campbell v. Acuff-Rose' 20 that the Court declared fair use
an affirmative defense and placed the burden of proving fair use on the
113. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982).
114. See generally id.
115. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
116, Lunney, supra note 106, at 976; see generally Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain
Future of Fair Use in a Global Information Marketplace, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 (2001).
117. Lunney, supra note 106, at 976.
118. Id.at977.
119. Id. at 988-89.
120, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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defendant. 121 The Court failed to reconcile its new classification of fair
use with Sony.122 As digital technology progresses, the market failure
approach advocates a reduced role for, or even a complete abrogation of,
fair use.123  Transaction costs associated with licensing new digital
technology, at least theoretically, can be sharply reduced. 24 Copyright
owners can insert licensing fees directly into copying technologies,
which would all but eliminate the transaction-costs-based market
failure. 25  Thus, these market mechanisms threaten to displace fair
use. 126
To her credit, scholars have misinterpreted Professor Gordon's
work and expanded the market failure approach beyond her original
intent. The usual argument supporting Professor Gordon's theory is that
fair use may only exist in the absence of transactions between owners
and consumers because of high transactional costs. 12 7 This was never her
vision of the market failure approach. In fact, Professor Gordon recently
stated:
I very much regret the way the market failure approach has grown-
up, or rather grown-down, since the publication of my original piece.
Transaction cost barriers are neither the only kind of economic
problem to which fair use responds, nor the only kind of problem to
which fair use should respond. Further, maximizing economic value
"as measured by willingness to pay" is not the only norm that matters
or should matter for fair use.128
The market failure theory is not correct. The major assumption of this
theory is that copyright owners will always license their works if the
transaction costs of licensing are not excessive. However, as is discussed
below, even the altogether elimination of transaction costs will not
alleviate the need for fair use.
C. Distinguishing Fair Use From Free Use
Copyright owners may not require licensing fees for consumer use
that constitutes fair use. 129 As a result, fair use is often misconstrued as
121. Lunney, supra note 106, at 989.
122. Id.




127. Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?, 78 NEB. L. REv. 880, 882
(1999).
128. Wendy J. Gordon, The "Market Failure" and Intellectual Property: A Response
to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031, 1034-35 (2002).
129. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
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free use. 3 ° Consumers shudder at the .thought of paying in the digital
world for uses they apparently receive for free in the analog world.
13
However, fair use never comes for free.' 32  Fair use in the analog
world-such as reading books in the library-does not entail licensing
fees. 133 Nevertheless, all fair uses cause consumers to incur transactional
costs, for example driving to the book store, lost wages, or time costs for
legitimate copying. 134  According to Professor Bell, "it makes no
difference that consumers pay licensing fees in cash whereas they pay
fair use's transaction costs in lost opportunities. Economically speaking,
a cost is a cost.'
13 5
Several commentators propose that, as transaction costs for
licensing approach negligible levels, copyright should adopt a system of
"fared use.' 136 Arguably, fared use will make more uses available to
consumers than fair use.' 37 This theory is based on the assumption that
as digital technologies increase the value of copyrighted works, these
same technologies will place deflationary pressure on the price of
accessing these works.' 38 Additionally, digital technologies will decrease
the copyrighted work's vulnerability to uncompensated uses and boost
the present value of the work. 139 Thus, copyright owners, theoretically,
will pass these economic gains on to consumers in the form of reduced
access fees. 14 0  Still, the concept of fared use is troubling for the
consumer. It is unsatisfying to imagine making direct payments for
every use of a copyrighted work. Despite these concerns from the
consumer's standpoint, fared use poses even larger problems for
copyright owners.
1. The Reciprocal Quasi-Compulsory License
With fared use, copyright owners will lose their selectivity in
licensing use, 14 1 forcing copyright owners to endure increased
licensing. 42 Thus, fared use establishes a system of reciprocal quasi-
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 575 (1998).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 580.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Bell, supra note 129, at 580.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 581.
138. Id. at 588.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 588-89.
141. Bell, supra note 129, at 597.
142. Id.
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compulsory licensing. 143 While the consumer is forced to pay for every
use, the owner is forced to provide access. From the owner's standpoint,
fared use imposes a quasi-duty to provide access that has not existed in
copyright law. Such a quasi-duty would intrude on owners' implied
rights. This is not a particularly attractive alternative for copyright
owners. Going back to Napster, the reciprocal quasi-compulsory license
would have required the recording industry to license use of its
copyrighted works to Napster. While this article will argue for limits on
the extended monopoly of copyrights, owners should retain some form of
autonomy. In fact, forcing owners to license their works simply because
of the nominal transaction costs of licensing will provide disincentives to
create new works. Ultimately, this will defeat the whole purpose of
copyright. Hence, an overreaching reciprocal quasi-compulsory license
could do as much harm as an abrogation of fair use.
2. The Market Failure of Fared Use
The concept of fared use oversimplifies the economics of fair use.
It rests on the theory of transactional costs incurred in making a fair use.
Driving to the library and paying municipal taxes are transactional costs
for access to copyrightable works. Of course, fair use is not free, but
there are two differences between costs associated with fair use and costs
associated with fared use. First, under the current scheme, fair users
incur transaction costs; however, these costs are not paid to copyright
owners. Proponents of fared use essentially assume these transaction
costs under fair use should now be passed on to the owners. Their view
identifies no difference between the nonmonetary transaction costs
incurred by consumers and the direct monetary benefits paid to copyright
owners.
Second, fared use hinders owners' ability to internalize the
externalities of providing works to the public. Copyright owners have
developed synergism to internalize the costs of making works available.
Under present distribution models, the cost of making one work available
is internalized through the sales of other works. Thus, a percentage of
sales of a bestseller internalize the costs of making less popular works
available. As a result, the costs of making works available for fair use
are internalized among all consumers. With fared use, individual fair
users must incur all these costs. Moreover, fared use presents a danger
for lesser known authors. Consider a typical museum visit. The
consumer goes to the museum to view a Monet exhibit. The consumer
incurs the costs of gas, parking, admission, and lost time to see the
143. Id.
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Monet exhibit. But while at the museum, the consumer sees a painting
by an unknown artist and purchases this painting. The Monet exhibit has
internalized the costs of making the unknown artist's work available.
This is the economic inefficiency of fared use. It imposes additional
costs on positive active consumerism, and it only benefits well-
established authors. It seeks to force consumers to make direct payments
for limited access when they are accustomed to making indirect
payments for this same access. Consumers will likely participate in fared
use for an author he or she knows, but none of these payments will
contribute to granting limited access to works of lesser known authors.
Consequently, fared use prevents (or greatly diminishes) the chances of
selling lesser known works. Even at the absurdly nominal rate of $0.01
per use, the results are not good. Could you imagine having to pay a
penny every time you looked at a book in a bookstore? Not only would
such a system be annoying, it would promote a sort of quasi-censorship
regime by discouraging use by impoverished persons. Thus, we need to
move to a more balanced point between free use and fair use.
Additionally, it is necessary to adjust the current fair use analysis to more
aptly apply to innovative mediums.
D. Sony Revisited
The rationalizations of fair use derive from the creation of new
works, not the creation of innovative mediums. Sony was particularly
unique because it was the first major fair use case involving a new
medium. Whether viewed as a defense to infringement or a separate
right, fair use was meant to have a narrow operation. Fair use was
designed to maintain the balance of copyright through application to
individual works. With the traditional fair use case, the ruling in the
individual case narrowly affects future cases. For instance, Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin144 (featuring the novel The Wind Done Gone)
did not abrogate parody altogether. Conversely, Campbell did not give
free reign to parody. 145 These cases simply helped clarify the boundaries
of parody.
The Court was presented with a new challenge in Sony. It had to
determine whether or not a new medium promoted acceptable use. If so,
consumers could use the new medium, subject to individual actions for
direct infringement. If not, consumers could not use the medium
altogether, even for noninfringing uses. This was a major leap from the
parameters of fair use, transcending the traditional modes of fair use as
144. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
145. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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new works. It exposed the need for a new test to evaluate innovative
mediums. However, before addressing this new test, it is necessary to
determine if copyright in fact promotes the development of innovative
mediums.
VI. Innovative Mediums: The Forgotten Intrest Promoted by
Copyright Law
While copyright law promotes the public interest by providing
authors with economic incentives to create new works of authorship, the
public interest is also served by the innovation of new mediums for
recording and disseminating information. New mediums are more
efficient, allowing more information to be distributed faster to more
consumers. For example, the advent of Westlaw and Lexis online
databases has dramatically changed the practice of law. There are two
views justifying why innovative mediums should be protected under
current copyright law.
A. The Second Fundamental Purpose of Copyright Law
The first justification for protecting innovative mediums under
copyright law is that innovation of new mediums is a second
fundamental purpose of copyright law. This view makes logical sense.
Promoting the useful arts would naturally dictate the creation of
innovative new mediums of expression, along with new works. If the
Founders sought to promote the useful arts, it stands to reason they
desired the innovation of new mediums. The glaring problem with
viewing innovation as a second fundamental purpose of copyright law is
the lack of any discussion of innovation in the Copyright Clause.
Two significant reasons explain the absence of such discussion.
First, the Founders anticipated innovative mediums would be developed
through patent law. Patent law grants temporary monopolies for new
inventions, which would include innovative mediums. 146 Apparently, the
Framers had a sort of one-two punch in mind: patent owners create new
mediums, while copyright owners create new content to disseminate
through those mediums. For example, Thomas Edison created the
phonograph and secured a patent on his new technology, thus creating a
new medium for expression. John Philip Sousa then recorded one of his
famous compositions, thus creating a new work. Without Edison, there
would have been no means to record Sousa's work. Without Sousa,
Edison's new medium would have provided little value.
Second, the original terms of copyrights were so limited as to negate
146. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105 (2003).
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the mentioning of innovative mediums. With truly limited copyright
terms, the preservation of the public domain facilitated innovation of
new mediums. Initially, most copyrights were limited to 14-year terms,
and only copyrights that were proven valuable would be renewed,
creating a total term of 28 years. 147 With such limitations in place, there
was an assumption that innovators would always have an ample amount
of works available in the public domain to design new mediums.
Consider Napster, which launched in 1999. If the original copyright
terms were still in place, Napster users could have freely transferred most
music from the 1970s and 1980s, and all music prior to 1971. Napster
could have launched, completely legal, with a great variety of music,
albeit not popular music. 148 Instead, with extended copyright protection,
the vast majority of public domain music available when Napster
launched was from the 19 th century (and even many 1 9th century works
were still under copyright protection).
B. A Flaw in the Present System of Copyright
The second justification for protecting innovative mediums is that
the system of "incentivizing" authors is subject to a major flaw. Owners
have incentives to create new works, but they have no incentives to
create new mediums of expression. 149  "Copyright owners have no
incentive to permit optimal innovation by facilitators, because they do
not benefit from that innovation, except indirectly."' 50 More accurately,
owners' incentives to keep creating new works in existing mediums far
exceed their incentives to create new works in new mediums because
implementing new mediums of expression requires the introduction of
unproven business models and unknown modes of copyright
enforcement.
C. Stifling Innovation Through Overprotection
Copyright owners have a rich history of protesting technological
147. Joyce & Patterson, supra note 1, at 940.
148. This would have put an incredible twist into the Ninth Circuit's Napster analysis.
Assuming a vast amount of public domain music for Napster users to choose from,
Napster may have facilitated enough fair uses to negate liability, perhaps enough to pass
muster under the Aimster standard.
149. The flaw may not be limited to innovative mediums, but could extend to the
creation of new works. This argument exceeds the scope of this article, but the recent
explosion of open-source software has raised questions regarding the current system of
copyright. See generally Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source
Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563 (2004).
150. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1350 (2004).
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advances. They fought cable television, home recording of movies, and
television broadcasts. Furthermore, they have a right to do so. The
social exchange for the limited monopoly provided to copyright owners
only requires the creation of new works, not the development of new
innovations. For example, why would the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) want to go digital? They know how to
make money under the existing analog business model. This model is
very successful and limits piracy to acceptable levels. By going digital,
piracy could reach unacceptable levels and profits may be lower. Even if
going digital is a long-term success, it will force short-term growing
pains in implementing the new model. Thus, the RIAA has no incentive
to support, much less develop, innovative mediums.
This article does not suggest content owners should have some
obligation to innovate or to facilitate innovation. Copyright rewards
works of authorship previously created. Once the owner performs the
work, he or she is entitled to profit from it. An obligation to innovate
after creating the work would impose two burdens on the owner for one
benefit. However, content owners should not be permitted to stifle
innovation through the overprotection of existing copyrights.
Unfortunately, content owners have moved away from choosing not
innovate and toward the stifling of innovation.
While copyright supports innovative mediums as a subsidiary
interest, copyright law itself cannot promote innovative mediums.
However, copyright law can stifle innovation of these mediums through
the overprotection of existing works. 151 Copyright law threatens the
innovation of new mediums in three ways. 152 First, copyright owners
may acquire "de facto control over new technologies of distribution."' 53
Second, expanding theories of liability may stifle the creation of fair use
technologies. 154 Third, copyright owners may acquire complete control
in the distribution of copyrighted works. 55 In essence, the present state
of copyright law stands poised to grant owners a "technological veto."'
156
Such a technological veto is inherently dangerous because the content
151. Numerous scholars have cautioned against the overprotection of intellectual
property, copyright in particular. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 8 (arguing for limited
copyright terms and limited protection for derivative works); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
(2003) (concluding the policy goals of intellectual property are best supported with
limited protection); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An
Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REv. 731 (2003)
(cautioning against the overextension of criminal liability for copyright infringement).
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industries often lack (or chooses to ignore) foresight when encountering
technological change. 157 History is rich with situations where the content
industries fought against technological change despite the potential for
new revenue platforms. 58 The best example was illustrated in Sony
when the movie industry objected to VHS technology, even though VHS
opened a secondary home-viewing market and ultimately enhanced the
profitability of the movie industry.
159
Admittedly, there is dispute whether a monopoly, even a cartel, will
stifle innovation.1 60  Arguments exist for both sides, but whether a
monopoly promotes or stifles innovation remains undetermined.
161
Nonetheless, fostering innovation is a recognized goal of antitrust law,
162
and copyright law shares a growing relationship with antitrust. 63  A
definitive answer to the effect of monopolistic power on innovation
exceeds the scope of this article. At issue here is how cartel behavior
affects innovation in industries based on copyrighted works, most
notably the entertainment industry. Within this limited framework cartel
behavior has stifled innovation. To explain why, it is necessary to
analyze two types of competition involved in these industries. The first
type of competition is direct competition between copyright owners
(hereinafter "traditional competition"). Traditional competition involves
inside firms competing to sell their works to consumers. The second
type of competition is the constant struggle over consumer autonomy
(hereinafter "autonomous competition"). With autonomous competition,
outside firms introduce innovative mediums to enhance consumer
autonomy. Inside firms must then accept the advance in consumer
157. Id.
158. Fagin et al., supra note 12, at 499.
159. Id. at 499-500. The same pattern was observed in the history of radio. See
Lemley & Reese, supra note 150, at 1387.
160. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 19-22 (2d ed. 2001).
161. Id. at 20.
162. See United Statea v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 696 (9th Cir. 2004);
Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Freeman v. San
Diego Ass'n of Realtors, No. 01-56199, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 7731, at *42 (9th Cir.
March 10, 2003). See generally John J. Flynn, Antitrust and the Suppression of
Technology in the United States and Europe: Is there a Remedy? Antitrust Policy,
Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression of Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487
(1998); David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729 (2001); Charles A. Black, The Cure for Deadly Patent
Practices: Preventing Technology Suppression and Patent Shelving in the Life Sciences,
14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 397 (2004).
163. See generally Neal Hartzog, Gaining Momentum: A Review of Recent
Developments Surrounding the Expansion of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and Analysis
of the Doctrine in its Current Form, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 373 (2004)
(determining antitrust violations used by some courts in analyzing copyright misuse
cases); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09
(Matthew Bender ed., 2003).
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autonomy or act to remove the new medium from the market.
1. Innovation in Traditional Competition
Firms respond to innovation in traditional competition out of
necessity. They may not particularly want to introduce change, but they
have to in order to remain competitive. CBS introduced Survivor, a
reality show with a minimal script and no professional actors, in the
summer of 2000.164 It was a major success. Once Survivor generated
massive ratings for CBS, the other networks had to scramble for
comparable reality television programming. Thus was born The
Bachelor, The Apprentice, and a score of other reality television shows.
The other networks probably did not want to venture into reality
television. They were comfortable in the realm of traditional television
programming, but were forced into reality television because of the
success CBS achieved. Thus, the reality television transition was a
response to traditional competition.
Traditional competition fosters innovation to a limited extent.
However, these innovations do not provide advances in consumer
autonomy. Rather, the innovation remains within the confines of
established modes of autonomy. For example, the innovation of reality
television only provided a different type of programming. Consumers
did not gain autonomy in how they enjoyed the programming; they still
had to wait for a certain time on a certain day. Likewise, the music
industry's movement from cassette tapes to compact discs only improved
the sound quality of the music. Consumers were still confined to the
established music distribution model. More accurately stated, traditional
competition fosters incentive for limited innovation. The innovation is
limited because any innovation will remain within the confines of
traditional modes of consumer autonomy and established business
models.
The economist Joseph Schumpeter classified this mode of limited
innovation as the result of a commitment to a static market model of
competition. 165 Schumpeter opined that major market players committed
to this model assumed a static world where the fundamentals of the
model did not change. 166 Thus, when an industry, like the entertainment
industry, is categorized by overextensive property protection, firms may
actually act to limit the industry within the established static market
164. See With Strike Averted, Hollywood Wonders What Next (May 7, 2001) at
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/SHOWBIZ/TV/05/07/hollywood.labor/ (last visited June
12, 2005).
165. RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 308 (2000).
166. Id.
[Vol. 110:1
THE INNOVATIVE MEDIUM DEFENSE
model of competition. With copyright protection extending beyond 100
years in most cases, and with said protection encompassing derivative
works, firms in the entertainment industry may seek to quash innovation
that exceeds the scope of the established model. In other words, if
innovation in autonomous competition benefits consumers more than
owners, firms will exercise their power to limit autonomous competition,
ultimately stifling innovation.
2. Innovation in Autonomous Competition
Autonomous competition moves away from the traditional model of
firms in the same industry competing against each other. Instead, firms
from outside the industry introduce new products that affect that
industry. These new products from outside finns enhance consumer
autonomy; hence, consumers get more freedom in selecting when and
how to consume the copyrighted works. Thus, innovation in autonomous
competition provides immediate benefits to consumers and outside firms;
conversely, innovation from autonomous competition is detrimental to
inside firms, at least in the short run. As consumers gain autonomy,
inside firms lose autonomy. Stated differently, the potential value of the
work in a new medium is apparently lower than the value of the same
work in existing mediums.
To avoid the diminishment in value of works in existing mediums,
inside firms want to restrict autonomous competition. The increase of
consumer autonomy is a cause that yields two effects. First, the value of
the copyrighted work goes down, which eventually allows for the
introduction of new competitors into the industry. Consider the
introduction of MP3s in the music industry. MP3s not only increased
consumer autonomy, but also paved the way for online music
distribution. Under the cheaper digital distribution model, more firms
can enter the music industry and compete with existing firms. Second,
even though new innovations will eventually enhance profitability for
inside firms, they are required to make significant investments in new
business models with unknown modes of enforcement before realizing
the newfound profitability.
3. Striking a Balance on Innovation
The battle lines have become clearly drawn in the entertainment
industry: outside firms want to provide new mediums that enhance
consumer autonomy, while firms inside the industry seek to stifle any
such innovation. Copyright law must embrace innovation by seeking a
middle ground that "balances the incentive structure of copyright
protection with copyright's concern for the public domain and for the
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legitimate fair use privileges of the public."'' 67 Two key provisions of the
Copyright Act have drastically affected this balance. First, the addition
of derivative works to the scope of copyright protection 168 has prevented
autonomous competition from destroying the value in the copyrighted
works altogether. Protecting derivative works guarantees copyright
owners an adequate return on their investment, even in the wake of new
innovations. Second, the extension of copyright protection to the life of
the author plus 70 years 169 has increased owners' abilities to stifle
innovation. The longer works maintain copyright protection, the less
works are available in the public domain for innovators to enhance
consumer autonomy. Professor Lessig has cautioned against
overprotection in terms of derivative works and the length of
protection.
170
It is understandable that the entertainment industry wants to
preserve analog value; however, the decrease in analog value is a risk of
venturing into an industry based on the exploitation of copyrighted
works. Copyright has transitioned from a cost-based system to a value-
based system.' 7' With this transition, the value of a copyrighted work
has become volatile, subject to changing market conditions. 172 If a new
medium reduces the value of a copyrighted work, that reason alone is not
enough to stifle the innovation altogether. The entertainment cartels
have to find new ways to generate value in new mediums. This is the
heart of the market economy. Typewriter manufacturers were not able to
prevent computers. Stove makers could not stifle the microwave. The
entertainment industry should not be able to stifle innovative mediums.
This balance between copyright protection and development of
innovative mediums can only be achieved by limiting the scope of
secondary liability.
VII. Expanding Secondary Liability: The Tool for Stifling Innovation
Copyright law entails two forms of secondary liability-
contributory liability and vicarious liability. Contributory liability will
attach to one "who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
167. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management,
15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 41, 54-55 (2001); see also PERrrZ, supra note 165, at 65-70
(presenting a mixed fair use infrastructure to facilitate fair use).
168. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2003).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2003).
170. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 294-96.
171. See Kevin M. Lemley, Eliminating Value of Infringement: An Economic
Analysis of Internal Transactions and Indirect External Transactions in Software
Infringement Cases (forthcoming 2005) (on file with author).
172. RUSSELL L. PARR & GORDON V. SMITH, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 152-54 (3d ed. 2000).
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causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another.... ,173 Vicarious liability consists of two elements. First, the
defendant must have the right and ability to control the infringing
conduct. 174  Second, the defendant must have an obvious and direct
financial benefit from the infringing conduct. 175 With both contributory
and vicarious infringement, there must be a direct infringement
committed by consumers.176 Secondary liability preserves the balance of
autonomy in copyright. It extends liability to third parties in situations
where third parties improperly provide too much autonomy to
consumers. Conversely, secondary liability puts limitations in force on
the third parties that owners may sue, thus preventing owners from
taking too much autonomy from consumers.
A. The Implied Element of Secondary Liability
An implied element of secondary liability is that the underlying
infringement must be deterred through imposing secondary liability.
Because secondary liability requires direct infringement, logic dictates
that the imposition of secondary liability will prevent future acts of direct
infringement from occurring. For purposes of this article, I will refer to
this implied element as "direct deterrent." No court has listed direct
deterrent as an element of either form of secondary liability because
before decentralized P2P technology, there was no need to add such an
element. If the other requirements of secondary liability were met, the
direct infringement involved would be deterred upon the filing of a
lawsuit.
B. Secondary Liability's Threat to Innovative Mediums
Expanding liability to technological providers threatens to stifle
innovation. 177 Likewise, expanding liability to other third parties, like
investors, "will stifle investment in innovation."'' 78 Additionally, the
case-by-case basis by which courts determine liability for infringement
poses significant problems. 179 "[L]awsuits based on indirect liability
sweep together both socially beneficial and socially harmful uses of a
program or service, either permitting both uses or condemning both."
'1 80




177. Lemley & Reese, supra note 150, at 1349.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1349-50.
180. Id. at 1350.
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Because innovative mediums always constitute dual-use technologies,
consumers may use dual-use technologies for noninfringing or infringing
purposes. 181  Dual-use technologies are not inherently new to
copyright. 182  "After all, musical instruments can be put to both
infringing and noninfringing uses." 183  Other examples of dual-use
technologies in the analog world are photocopiers and VCRs. These are
all examples of accepted technologies, that is, technologies that have
already established their social value.184  Society has accepted these
technologies as part of the status quo; 85 thus, they receive protection for
their established values.
1 86
Innovative mediums do not enjoy this same protection, making
them more susceptible to legal attack.187 Innovative mediums have yet to
prove their dominant social value or become rooted in the status quo.188
Making new technologies illegal will not cause social disruption.
189
Therefore, attempts to expand secondary liability equate to attempts to
eliminate new dual-use technologies before they can enter the realm of
accepted technologies and become part of the status quo. This attempt to
quash new technologies by imposing secondary liability on innovators
threatens innovation and the very purpose for copyright. Additionally, as
secondary liability expands, not only does the value of the copyright to
the owner increase, but the social harms inflicted on the public are also
increased. When a device is banned on the basis of secondary liability,
innovation of future similar devices is directly restricted.190 Moreover,
the public realizes a present cost measurable by "the net social value of
that innovation."' 91 For example, if courts declare P2P technologyper se
illegal, two social harms are inflicted. First, innovators of the next
technology beyond P2P are discouraged from innovating. Second, the
public will lose the social value of the noninfringing uses P2Ps offer,
including future benefits not yet developed. 
192
181. Id. at 1355.
182. Id.
183. Lemley & Reese, supra note 150, at 1355.





189. Lemley & Reese, supra note 150, at 1389.
190. Id. at 1386.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1386-87.
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C. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd: The Ninth
Circuit Focuses on Secondary Liability
On August 19, 2004, the Ninth Circuit rendered its highly
anticipated opinion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.193 This was the court's first encounter with decentralized P2Ps. The
court highlighted the ongoing conflict between copyright owners and
innovators:
From the advent of the player piano, every new means of reproducing
sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright owners,
often resulting in federal litigation. This appeal is the latest reprise of
that recurring conflict, and one of a continuing series of lawsuits
between the recording industry and distributors of file-sharing
computer software.1
94
Holding in favor of the defendants Grokster and StreamCast Networks
(hereinafter the "Software Distributors"), the court took careful aim to
distinguish its previous rulings in Napster and Fonavision.
1. Contributory Infringement
a. Substantial Noninfringing Uses
The Software Distributors went beyond their burden in proving
noninfringing uses for their products. Not only did they demonstrate that
their products were capable of substantial noninfringing use, but they
also showed the commercial viability of these uses.195 The court was
particularly intrigued by evidence presented by Wilco, a popular band.
196
Wilco's record company refused to release the band's album, claiming a
lack of commercial potential. 197 Wilco bought the album from the record
company and made it available for download over the Software
Distributors' networks. 198 Consumers demonstrated so much interest in
Wilco through these downloads that Wilco received a second contract.' 99
Moreover, the court took a direct shot at the Seventh Circuit's
noninfringing use standard as set forth in Aimster, which requires a
showing of substantial noninfringing use rather than the existence of
193. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004).
194. Id. at 1158.
195. Id. at 1162.
196. Id. at 1161.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1161.
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noninfringing use.200  The Grokster plaintiffs argued that the P2P
software in question was primarily used for infringement and urged the
court to adopt the Aimster standard. 20 1  The court discarded this
argument, holding that software "need only be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses. 202 Furthermore, the court alluded that the software
at issue may have even passed the Aimster standard:
Even if we were free to [adopt the Aimster rationale], we do not read
Sony-Betamax's holding as narrowly as does the Seventh Circuit.
Regardless, it is not clear that application of the Aimster rationale
would assist the Copyright Owners here. Implicit in the Aimster
analysis is that a finding of substantial noninfringing use, including
potential use, would be fatal to a contributory infringement claim,
regardless of the level of knowledge possessed by the defendant. In
Aimster, no evidence was tendered of any noninfringing product
203use.
The Software Distributors were able to show two substantial
noninfringing uses. First, thousands of groups like Wilco authorized
distribution of their works over the network.20 4 Second, users were able
to distribute files other than music over the network, including works
already in the public domain. 20 5  These uses reduced the costs of
distributing authorized art and speech, as well as public domain works.20 6
These uses certainly met the requisite standard in the Ninth Circuit, and
may even have survived scrutiny in the Seventh Circuit: "Indeed, even
at a 10% level of legitimate use, as contended by the Copyright Owners,
the volume of use would indicate a minimum of hundreds of thousands
of legitimate file exchanges.20 7 Thus, the court made a strong inference
regarding the required amount of noninfringing use, whether using the
Ninth Circuit standard or the Seventh Circuit standard: the level of
noninfringing use is considered by itself, not as a percentage of total
use.
208
Determining the level of noninfringing use as a stand-alone figure
was a crucial decision. Because copyrighted works are distributed in
200. See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003).
201. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1162.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1162 n.9. Another way to examine this language is that the court was
extending the Seventh Circuit an opportunity to retreat somewhat from the Aimster
standard and form a standard more harmonious with the Ninth Circuit's. It will be
interesting to see how the Seventh Circuit responds.
204. Id. at 1161.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1164.
207. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1162 n.10.
208. See id.
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digital form, new digital technologies will always have some infringing
uses. Furthermore, with copyright protection now extending beyond 100
years in many cases, and the public domain vastly depleted, it will be all
but impossible for new technologies to have an infringing use figure that
is less than 50%. Analyzing noninfringing use by itself, as the Ninth
Circuit did, will help promote future technologies.
b. Knowledge
For contributory infringement to apply, the Software Developers
would have to have (1) had specific knowledge of the infringement, (2)
acquired this knowledge at a time when they contributed to the
infringement, and (3) failed to act upon this information. 20 9 The design
of the Software Developers' software was crucial. The plaintiffs relied
on Napster, but Napster maintained a centralized index.210 In this case,
the Software Developers provided decentralized P2P technology:
"[E]ven if the Software Distributors 'closed their doors and deactivated
all computers within their control, users of their products could continue
sharing files with little or no interruption.',, 211  The timing of the
knowledge was also crucial: the Software Developers could only
become aware of infringement once the software had been distributed.
Furthermore, they had no control over the users' activities once the
software had been distributed.
This lack of control demonstrated a major flaw in the plaintiffs'
argument: secondary liability of the defendants, for the purposes of
preventing infringement over their software, was moot. Even if the
plaintiffs won the case, their victory would not prevent infringement
through the use of the software already available to consumers. In other
words, imposing liability on the defendants would not alleviate the direct
infringement for which the secondary liability was predicated. Thus, the
plaintiffs failed to show the required element of direct deterrent.
c. Material Contribution
Recently, the Ninth Circuit expanded the material contribution
element, most notably holding the owner of a swap meet liable for
209. Id. at 1162.
210. Id. at 1162-63. With centralized P2P software like Napster, users communicate
with each other through a centralized index. All infringement actually occurs through the
P2P's server. With decentralized P2P technology, users communicate without the use of
a server provided by the P2P. Any infringement occurs solely between the users. See
Lemley, supra note 99, at 628.
211. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1163 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).
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contributory infringement in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.2 12
Rather than retreat from its previous position, the court distinguished this
case from Fonovisa. First, "the Software Distributors do not provide the
'site and facilities' for infringement, and do not otherwise materially
contribute to direct infringement., 213  The Software Distributors
maintained neither file indices nor power to suspend user accounts.2 14
Instead, it is the software users themselves who provided the forum for
infringement by connecting to each other over the Internet.1 5
This was an important determination by the court, highlighting the
all-or-nothing choices presented to courts in determining secondary
liability for copyright infringement. If providing software equated to
providing the forum for infringement, it would place a major burden on
the development of software similar to P2Ps in the future, as the software
developers would satisfy this prong of the contributory liability test
simply by making their software available to consumers. Instead, the
court all but eradicated contributory infringement in cases of innovative
software. If providing the software is not providing the forum for
infringement, future plaintiffs will not be able to establish this element of
contributory infringement against software providers.
2. Vicarious Infringement
It was undisputed that the software developers had a direct financial
benefit from the consumers' direct infringment in this case; therefore, the
only element in dispute in determining liability for vicarious
infringement was the right and ability of the software developers to
supervise the infringing conduct.216 The court again distinguished this
case from Napster and Fonovisa. Neither of the software developers had
the ability to block user access.217 StreamCast claimed no user control
whatsoever.21 8 Grokster claimed a nominal right to terminate access, but
it had no power to actually exercise this right.219 Unlike Napster and
Fonovisa, "[t]he sort of monitoring and supervisory relationship that has
supported vicarious liability in the past is completely absent in this
case. ' 22°  Again, the court relied on the nature of the softwaredevelopers' P2P design:
212. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
213. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1163.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1164.
217. Id. at 1165.
218. Id.
219. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1165.
220. Id.
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The nature of the relationship between Grokster and StreamCast and
their users is significantly different from the nature of the relationship
between a swap meet operator and its participants, or prior versions
of Napster and its users, since Grokster and StreamCast are more
truly decentralized, peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.
221
The plaintiffs attacked the decentralized nature of these P2Ps, claiming
liability should attach for "turning a blind eye" to the infringement of
their users.222 The court quickly disregarded this argument. Because no
"blind eye" theory exists independent of the traditional elements of
liability, the "blind eye" claim is subsumed into the vicarious
infringement claim and ultimately fails.
223
3. Autonomy
The court made a major statement regarding consumer autonomy:
The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old
markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are
sold through well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history
has shown that time and market forces often provide equilibrium in
balancing interests, whether the new technology be a player piano, a
copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer, a
karaoke machine, or an MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent for courts to
exercise caution before restructuring liability theories for the purpose
of addressing specific market abuses, despite their apparent present
magnitude.
224
In other words, the court is saying that advances in consumer autonomy,
and thus innovation, should not be deemed illegal from the outset. While
increased consumer autonomy threatens current business models, it is up
to the owners to come up with new business models in light of
innovation. The court warned against altering the balance of copyright
law to satisfy the immediate needs of the content industry.2 25
D. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: The
Supreme Court Limits Its Analysis to Active Inducement
On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
holding there was enough evidence of wrongful intent by the P2Ps to
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1166.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1167.
225. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1167.
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induce infringement, thus precluding summary judgment.226 The Court
adopted the inducement rule from patent law, holding:
[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties.
227
This was a narrow ruling that centered on evidence demonstrating
negative active consumerism by Grokster and Streamcast. 28 The Court
addressed concerns that the inducement rule would stifle innovation:
"The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate
commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise. 229 The
Court clarified the distinction between Sony and Grokster. Sony was
decided on facts where there was no evidence the technology's innovator
"stated or indicated intent to promote infringing uses., 230 Thus, Sony has
a limited application and only applies absent evidence of inducement.23'
The Court began its analysis with marketing tools used during the
Napster litigation. While Napster was being sued, StreamCast
232distributed a software called OpenNap to Napster users. 2 Internal
company documents showed StreamCast was seeking to become the next
Napster and sought to accomplish their goal by attracting Napster
users.233 Internal e-mails showed StreamCast was prepared to capture all
Napster customers if Napster was forced to shut down.234 StreamCast
had launched an advertisement that read: "'Napster Inc. has announced
that it will soon begin charging you a fee. That's if the courts don't order
it shut down first. What will you do to get around it?',' 235 Perhaps the
most damning evidence was the statement of StreamCast's chief
technology officer: "'[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and get
sued. It's the best way to get in the new[s].' ' 236 Grokster did not fare
much better. Grokster launched its own OpenNaps software.237 Grokster
226. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. 04-480 (U.S. June
27, 2005).
227. Id. at 19.
228. Id. at 6-8.
229. Id. at 19-20.
230. Id. at 14.
231. Id. at 16.
232. Grokster, Ltd., No. 04-480, slip op. at 6.
233. Id.
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was also seeking to attract Napster users. 238 Finally, the Court was most
persuaded of the presence of active inducement of infringement by the
two companies' revenue models.239 Both companies generated revenue
solely by selling advertising space to third parties; they did not receive
money from users.240 Because demand is greater for works that are still
protected by copyright, StreamCast and Grokster were generating more
revenue from infringing uses than from noninfringing uses.24'
The Court clarified the distinction between Sony and Grokster.
Sony was decided on facts where there was no evidence that the
technology's innovator "stated or indicated intent to promote infringing
uses."242 Thus, Sony has a limited application and only applies when
there is no evidence of the innovator inducing consumers to infringe.243
Given that StreamCast and Grokster (1) targeted infringers from Napster,
(2) never attempted to develop filtering tools, and (3) deprived the
majority of their revenues from infringing use, the Court held there was
sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment.244
The Court seemed to favor a proposed a bill to amend the Copyright
Act-the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004
("Inducement Act"). 245 It is a short but powerful piece of legislation,
which in its entirety states:
(g)(1) In this subsection, the term "intentionally induces" means
intentionally aids, abets, induces, or procures, and intent may be
shown by acts from which a reasonable person would find intent to
induce infringement based upon all relevant information about such
acts then reasonable available to the actor, including whether the
activity relies on infringement for its commercial viability.
(2) Whoever intentionally induces any violation identified in
subsection (a) shall be liable as an infringer.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish the doctrines
of vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement or
require any court to unjustly withhold or impose any secondary
liability for copyright infringement.
246
238. Grokster, Ltd., No. 04-480, slip op. at 7.
239. Id. at 8.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 8, 22.
242. Id. at 14.
243. Id. at 16.
244. Grokster, Ltd., No. 04-480, slip op. at 22-24.
245. S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
246. Id.
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The problem with the Court's ruling and the Inducement Act is the
limited scope of the inducement standard. The inducement standard
applies when the innovator engages in extensive negative active
consumerism. The conduct of StreamCast and Grokster addressed in the
Court's opinion was irregular. Proponents of the Inducement Act could
only point to one P2P, EarthStation5, which boasted, "While other peer 2
peer networks like Kazaa or Imesh continue to deny building their
programs for illegal file sharing, at ES5 we not only admit why we built
ES5, we actually promote P2P, endorse file sharing, and join our users in
swapping files!",
247
Future innovators will learn from these mistakes and not engage in
negative active consumerism. Because the inducement standard has no
application when negative active consumerism is absent, the Grokster
ruling fails to address the future of innovative mediums. What standard
should apply when the innovator engages in positive active
consumerism? Before answering that question, it is necessary to explore
copyright owners' ability to stifle innovation when negative active
consumerism is absent.
VIII. The Case Against the ReplayTV 4000
"In 2001, four separate but related suits claiming various copyright
infringements were filed against SONICblue, the manufacturer of a
personal video recorder (PVR) named the ReplayTV 4000.''248 This case
was supposed to be a major decision affecting consumer autonomy in the
digital age.249  It should have been the seminal case addressing
contributory liability and fair use of PVRs, akin to a modern-day Sony.25°
A PVR is best analogized as "a videocassette recorder for the digital
age. 251  PVRs receive and store programs as digital files on a hard
drive.252 Because of their digital storage capabilities, PVRs can rewind
or even pause live television broadcasts.253 The ReplayTV 4000 featured
a number of unique features that enhanced consumer autonomy.
247. 150 CONG. REc. S7189 (2004).
248. Aaron A. Hurowitz, Copyright in the New Millennium: Is the Case Against
ReplayTV a New Betamax for the Digital Age?, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 145 (2003).
249. See generally id. (suggesting the case was supposed to determine if television
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A. ReplayTV 4000 Features
1. Send Show Feature
The most important feature of the ReplayTV 4000 is the Send Show
feature.25 4 Consumers can send digital copies of stored programs to other
ReplayTV 4000 consumers.255 This feature has a number of limitations.
First, consumers can only send programs to a maximum of 15 other
consumers.2 5 6 Second, the receiving consumer must own a ReplayTV
4000.257 Third, the sending consumer must know the address of the
receiving consumer's ReplayTV 4000.258 Fourth, the size of the files
imposes time restraints. For example, transferring a full-length feature
file will take a full day, if not longer.259 Along with television programs,
and subject to the above limitations, consumers could also send other
260digital files, such as digital photos and digital home movies.
The Send Show feature is not limited to transactions between
different ReplayTV 4000 consumers. Consumers may distribute
programs to other locations in their homes. A consumer could record a
program from a ReplayTV 4000 in the living room and then send that
program to a second ReplayTV 4000 in the bedroom.
261
2. AutoSkip Feature
The AutoSkip Feature allows consumers to skip commercials during
television broadcasts.262  The AutoSkip Feature is far from perfect.
ReplayTV claimed that, under perfect conditions, the AutoSkip feature
would skip 96% of commercials. 263 The success rate of this feature is
closer to the 70%-90% range, varying with each program.264  The
essence of the AutoSkip Feature is far from new.265 For several years, a
number of 4-head VCRs have been available that allow consumers to
skip commercials.26 6




258. Id. It is disputed whether or not the recipient can then transfer the file to
additional parties.
259. Id.





265. Id. at 154-55.
266. Hurowitz, supra note 248, at 154-55.
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3. Library Feature
The ReplayTV 4000 has a couple of features that combine to form
the "Library Feature." First, consumers may use keywords to find
programs they wish to record.267 This feature is common to almost all
PVRs.268 What makes the ReplayTV 4000 different is its expanded
storage capacity of 320 hours. 2 69 Along with this extra storage capacity,
the ReplayTV 4000 is equipped with a Show Organizer which permits
consumers "to sort and organize all recorded programs into related
categories. 27 °
B. The Claims and Defenses
The studios made traditional copyright infringement claims against
ReplayTV 4000, with different arguments for each of the different
features.271 The studios focused on the negative impact that ReplayTV
4000 had on the value of their works. The studios' arguments are just as
revolutionary as Sony's arguments against the Betamax more than 20
years ago.272 Moreover, the studios' arguments are subject to two crucial
flaws. First, their arguments are limited by the present availability of
broadband connectivity in homes.273 "Most modem high-speed home
internet connections do not allow for the transmitting speeds needed to
effectively and efficiently distribute video over the internet., 274 Second,
the studios' arguments merely seek to protect their current business
models.275 Copyright law exists to promote the useful arts, not to solidify
business models.
1. Send Show Feature
The studios levied three objections against the Send Show
27Feature. 76 First, they claimed the Send Show Feature will allow
consumers to send programs to consumers who have not paid for the
subscription service from which the program was copied.27 7 Second,
they argued this feature would threaten the "system by which costly




271. Id. at 156.




276. Id. at 156.
277. Id.
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copyrighted material is offered by free, over-the-air television networks
and local stations., 278 Third, the studios claimed the Send Show Feature
would impair their ability to profit from "repurposing. 279 Repurposing
"is the practice of re-running programs originally broadcast over-the-air
on non-broadcast networks. 28 °
In defending the Send Show Feature, ReplayTV focused on the
staggering differences between the ReplayTV 4000 and Napster.281
Because consumers are limited in the number of distributions they can
make and to whom they can make the distributions, ReplayTV likened
the Send Show feature to friends sharing videocassettes.282 Additionally,
files cannot be retransmitted once they are sent. Thus, ReplayTV
claimed that, for free programming, the Send Show feature will increase,
not decrease, the viewing public.283 Also, only sophisticated consumers
purchased the ReplayTV 4000 device.284 The vast majority of these
sophisticated consumers also subscribed to premium channels, so most
transmissions would be between consumers who had both paid the
requisite subscription.285 The ReplayTV 4000 also honored Macrovision,
a copy protection technology authorized by Congress, thus prohibiting
consumers from sending files protected by Macrovision or other copy-
protection programs.286
2. AutoSkip Feature
As to the AutoSkip Feature, the studios argued that the
"unauthorized making of copies of television programming for the
purpose of viewing with all commercials automatically deleted is not a
fair use, and goes far beyond the narrowly circumscribed conduct
discussed by the Supreme Court in the 1984 Sony Betamax decision.'
287
The crux of the studios' argument is that they want to require consumers
to watch commercials, even when viewing time-shifted copies of
programming. 288 In other words, no use could ever be fair use if it does
not fit within the confines of the owner's established business model.289
ReplayTV argued that the essence of the AutoSkip feature was available
278. Hurowitz, supra note 248, at 157.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 158.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Hurowitz, supra note 248, at 158.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 156.
288. Id. at 161.
289. Id.
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in VCRs for a number of years without causing a negative effect on the
creation of movies and television programs.29° Moreover, ReplayTV
pointed out that "no principal of copyright requires consumers to watch
commercials.,
291
ReplayTV cemented its argument by stating that consumers have
never been required to watch commercials. The studios were operating
on the major assumption that, without the AutoSkip Feature, consumers
will actually watch commercials. But what about using the remote
control to switch channels while commercials are playing? Moreover,
consumers get up during commercials to get food, drink, or use the
bathroom. If the plaintiffs' arguments against the AutoSkip Feature are
taken on their face, a plethora of household appliances would be subject
to secondary liability for copyright infringement.
By trying to force consumers to watch commercials, the studios are
merely seeking to entrench their advertising-based business model. The
purpose of copyright law is not to protect this model; it is the copyright
owner's responsibility to maximize profitability by adapting to new
mediums. The studios have already responded to this feature. One
292response is changing the start and finish times for programs. Up until
this year, programming was very predictable. A show slated to run from
7:00 to 7:30 started promptly at 7:00, and usually ended shortly before
7:30. Now, the same program may start at 6:57 and run until 7:33. This
is a clever trick to make consumers spend more time in front of the
television by making the commercials more unpredictable.
3. Library Feature
Finally, the plaintiffs claimed the Library Feature would allow
consumers to "organize disparate recordings into coherent
collections. '293 According to the plaintiffs, these collections would
undermine the markets for subsidiary products such as DVDs.294
ReplayTV 4000 countered that such collections constituted fair use of
non-commercial time-shifting.295
290. Hurowitz, supra note 248, at 157.
291. Id.
292. See Gary Levin, Shows Start and End Just off the Half-Hour (Nov. 28, 2004),
available at http://www.usatoday.comi/life/televisionI/news/2004-11-28-tv-
schedulex.htm (last visited 6/4/05).
293. Hurowitz, supra note 248, at 157.
294. Id. at 161.
295. Id. at 157.
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C. Distinctions Between ReplayTV 4000 and Napster
Because Napster is now the benchmark that copyright owners use to
attack new technologies, it was paramount for ReplayTV 4000 to
distinguish its services from Napster 96 First, ReplayTV 4000 had no
centralized server like Napster 97 Second, unlike Napster, ReplayTV
4000 consumers were limited in both the number of distributions they
could make and to whom they could distribute files.2 98  Third, the
ReplayTV 4000 allowed transmission of programs "already available to
those other ReplayTV 4000 users for free. 299 Music files distributed on
Napster were not generally available for free, a point the Ninth Circuit
drew upon in finding Napster was reducing sales.300 With these key
distinctions, it was likely the court would have ruled in favor of
ReplayTV 4000. However, before the court could make any such ruling,
the plaintiffs achieved a defacto victory.
D. A De Facto Victory for the Plaintiffs
During the course of this litigation, SONICblue filed for
bankruptcy.30' Pursuant to the bankruptcy proceedings, SONICblue sold
its ReplayTV 4000 assets to Digital Networks North America, Inc.
(DNNA).302 DNNA removed the AutoSkip and Send Show features,
which triggered a voluntary dismissal from the plaintiffs.30 3 Prior to the
bankruptcy proceedings, five ReplayTV 4000 owners (Newmark
Plaintiffs) filed a declaratory action for the right to use their ReplayTV
4000 devices. 304 However, along with the voluntary dismissal stemming
from the bankruptcy proceeding, the copyright owners filed a covenant
not to sue the Newmark Plaintiffs. 30 5 The court held this covenant not to
sue, coupled with the dismissal of the ReplayTV 4000 suit, mooted the
Newmark Plaintiffs' claims.30 6 Without a controversy, the court found it
had no jurisdiction to hear the case.30 7 The court expressed its desire to
296. Id. at 158.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Hurowitz, supra note 248, at 158.
300. Id.





305. Id. at 924. The covenant not to sue was unilateral, unsupported by any
consideration, but the court was not persuaded that lack of enforceability would give rise
to a controversy or defeat the mootness of the Newmark Plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 926-27.
306. Id. at 927.
307. ReplayTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
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rule on the case:
To be sure, the battle between copyright owners to protect the value
of their works, and technological innovators and consumers over
freedom of access to those copyrighted works, will continue to rage
on in this electronic age. This issue is, without a doubt, a subject of
lively public debate. But the Court's role is limited by its Article III
powers to adjudicate only "cases or controversies .... Here, the
Court has determined that there is no live case or controversy, and




The copyright owners in this case achieved a de facto victory. The
original company behind ReplayTV 4000 went bankrupt. The new
company took away the features of ReplayTV 4000 that most upset the
owners. The copyright owners sent a strong warning signal to future
developers of digital television products. However, most important of
all, the copyright owners avoided a major ruling in favor of the
ReplayTV 4000 features.
E. Digital Television Beyond Replay TV 4000
ReplayTV represents the first skirmish in the soon-to-come battle
over digital television. The FCC has ordered the transition from analog
to digital television,30 9 and broadcasters have until December 31, 2006,
to effect this transition. 310  Broadcasters have vigorously fought this
transition without success.311 With the transition to digital television,
more technologies like ReplayTV 4000 will emerge in the near future.
Tivo is about to launch a new device that will enhance consumer
autonomy.312 The broadcasters' de facto victory in ReplayTV prevented
the court from setting the standard for evaluating innovative mediums
that enhance consumer autonomy in the digital television industry. It is
necessary to develop that standard now, for digital television will
become the next copyright litigation battleground. If the proper standard
is not formulated, courts may intrude upon the consumer autonomy
308. Id. at 929-30.
309. Frank Ing-Jye Chao, The FCC and Congress Should Consider Consumer Rights
When Making the Transition to DTV, 2003 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 17, 12 (2003).
310. Id. For a more thorough discussion of the digital television transition, see Daniel
Benoliel, Technological Standards, Inc.: Rethinking Cyberspace Regulatory
Epistemology, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1113-15 (2004).
311. See Consumer Elec. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Cmty.
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 216 F.3d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Office of Communication, Inc.
v. FCC, 327 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
312. See http://www.tivo.com/0.0.asp (last visited 11/20/04). For a general discussion
of Tivo, see Rina Dolmayan, The Fair Use Doctrine: How Does it Apply to New
Technology That May Impinge on Financial Interests of the Copyright Owners? 4 J.
LEGAL ADvoc. & PRAc. 186 (2002).
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granted in Sony and Grokster.
IX. The Innovative Medium Defense
Because the Supreme Court's Grokster ruling was limited to active
inducement, a new test--one that responds to copyright owners' ability
to stifle innovation and promotes a uniform standard among the courts-
must be implemented when active inducement is not present.313 This
article proposes the "innovative medium defense." The innovative
medium defense is rooted in the more traditional unclean hands doctrine.
Copyright owners have taken actions to stifle innovation, but they have
done so within the parameters of rights granted to them by Congress and
the courts. Therefore, this article will refer to owners as having quasi
unclean hands.31 4 Nonetheless, regardless of whether owners' actions
were within their granted rights, the stifling of innovation imposes harms
on the goals of copyright equal to or greater than the harm caused by
infringement. The application of the innovative medium defense will
promote, rather than frustrate, the intended goals of copyright.
315
The elements to the innovative medium test are as follows, with
each element receiving discussion in the subsections below:
(1) Is the primary purpose of the innovative medium to advance
consumer autonomy?
(2) Does the innovative medium provide more than a nominal amount
of noninfringing use?
(3) Does the innovative medium prevent consumers from unlimited
reproduction and distribution?
313. See generally Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair
Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107 (2001) (arguing for stronger fair use
protection in cyberspace); Jesse M. Freder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV.
859 (2004) (suggesting modifications to the fair use analysis when services are involved
with the new work).
314. The Supreme Court cautioned courts not to apply equitable doctrines if such
application would defeat the purpose of the statute at issue. Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) (disallowing the related defense of in par
delicto in an antitrust case). On considering a full application of the unclean hands
doctrine to copyright infringement, the Fifth Circuit observed, "Because the private suit
of the plaintiff in a copyright infringement action furthers the congressional goal of
promoting creativity, the courts should not concern themselves with the moral worth of
the plaintiff." Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 862
(5th Cir. 1979); accord Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1970)
(permitting in pari delicto defense in securities fraud case).
315. See supra note 314.
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(4) How does the innovative medium foster positive active
consumerism?
(5) Will copyright owners obtain an adequate return on their
copyrighted works?
These factors should be evaluated like the four fair use factors listed
in section 107, with each factor receiving equal weight. Additionally, the
factors are considered in the aggregate, with the balance tipping toward
either the innovative medium or the copyright owners.
A. Advance Consumer Autonomy
The first element of the innovative medium defense will ascertain
whether the primary purpose of the innovative medium is to advance
consumer autonomy. This factor will encompass the narrow
interpretation of the Inducement Act. It is an easy standard for the
innovator to meet, but the innovator may lose this factor by engaging in
negative active consumerism. If the innovator boasts infringement like
Corley and EarthStation5, the innovator will lose on this factor.
However, if the primary purpose of the innovation is to provide
consumer autonomy, the innovative medium will win on this factor.
B. More Than Nominal Noninfringing Use
The second step is to determine if the innovative medium provides
more than a nominal amount of noninfringing use. A bright line rule will
be avoided as to what amounts to more than nominal noninfringing use,
but Grokster sets a good precedent that 10% noninfringing use is not
nominal. This is an easy threshold for the innovative medium to reach.
If the innovative medium cannot meet this standard, there is not enough
social benefit provided to justify its existence. This standard is much
closer to the Ninth Circuit's standard than the Seventh Circuit's standard
because of the overprotective legal life of copyrighted works in
relationship to their economic life. In most cases, the legal life of a
copyrighted work far exceeds its economic life.316 Thus, for a number of
works, the innovative medium fosters infringement of works which have
lost their economic life. This standard seeks to eliminate the need of
evaluating "economically viable infringement" when dealing with an
innovative medium.
Furthermore, with protection extending beyond 100 years for most
copyrighted works, it would be difficult for any innovative medium to
316. PARR & SMITH, supra note 172, at 284.
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reach a level of 51% or greater noninfringing use. This factor seeks to
ensure the medium is capable of more than nominal noninfringing use,
which means the medium provides a reasonable level of social benefit
for any infringement that also occurs. Additionally, this factor allows
copyright owners to continue their strategy of bringing individual
lawsuits to deter infringement.
C. Unlimited Reproduction and Distribution
Next, courts must examine if the innovative medium prevents
consumers from unlimited reproduction and distribution. This factor
places a burden on innovators more so than owners. For example,
Grokster would not have met this factor because it allowed for the
unlimited reproduction and distribution of works. If the medium limits
reproduction and distribution, like ReplayTV 4000, it enhances the
probability the medium fosters more than a nominal amount of
noninfringing use. The purpose of this element is not to establish an
acceptable level of reproduction and distribution; rather, it is meant to
determine whether or not consumers have unfettered discretion in
reproductions and distributions to other consumers. The more
restrictions on reproduction and distribution, the more likely the social
benefits of the innovative medium outweigh its potential harms.
D. Foster Positive Active Consumerism
Fourth, it is necessary to analyze how the innovative medium
fosters positive active consumerism. This is a catch-all factor where the
innovator can argue all the socially beneficial functions of the medium.
For the owners, it is their opportunity to discredit any such uses and
demonstrate how the innovative medium fosters negative active
consumerism, namely infringement. The primary significance of this
factor is to analyze the potential the innovative medium provides in
terms of generating future works. The focus is on potential because the
entertainment industry litigates aggressively, and the medium will often
have little consumer exposure prior to trial. Under this analysis,
Grokster would have fared better than the ReplayTV 4000. Grokster had
objective evidence of subsequent works, such as the band Wilco
promoting itself and generating a contract through distribution over the
P2P network.1 7 ReplayTV 4000 had no such evidence of promoting
subsequent works.
This factor presents a unique burden to innovative mediums, but it
serves a particular importance. If innovators know this is a factor to
317. See discussion supra Part VII.C.
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determine secondary liability, they will incorporate tools for positive
active consumerism while developing the innovative medium. Rather
than just focusing on consumer autonomy, innovators will seek means to
improve positive active consumerism and promote the creation of
subsequent works-a fundamental tenet of copyright. If owners are
going to work against this tenet, it makes sense to give incentives to
innovators to promote this tenet.
E. Adequate Return for Owners
Finally, the innovative medium defense weighs whether copyright
owners may still obtain an adequate return on the copyrighted work.
This factor presents the biggest hurdle for owners. However, specificity
of damages is always a difficult factor for any plaintiff to meet. In the
past, the owners have argued extensively on speculative revenues that
will be lost if the innovative medium is not shut down. Under the
innovative medium test, owners will have to prove they can no longer
obtain an adequate return on their investment in the copyrighted work.
This is a different analysis from what courts have used thus far. As
consumer autonomy is enhanced by an innovative medium, the value of a
copyrighted work will initially go down. However, this initial decrease
in value is not a justifiable reason for eliminating the medium altogether.
With this factor, owners will have to show the innovative medium
defeats any adequate return on investment, not just an initial reduction in
the value of the copyrighted work.
F. Policy: Favorable Treatment to Innovative Mediums
The elements comprising the innovative medium defense tend to
favor innovators over owners. The reason for this leniency is rooted both
in the policy of copyright law and the history of owners' actions. First,
the goal of promoting the useful arts is best served by permitting more
innovations rather than excluding them. Innovative mediums serve as
dual-use technologies, and it is dangerous to impose blanket impositions
that swallow noninfringing uses. Second, owners do not need expanded
secondary liability to enforce their rights; they can still bring suits
against individual infringers.
Owners (primarily the entertainment industry) have long
complained of enormous losses because of piracy.318 As time passes,
these complaints carry less and less merit.319 The RIAA's series of
318. Lemley & Reese, supra note 150, at 1393.
319. Id. at 1393-94 ("Yet those same industries have survived and even thrived
despite significant piracy."). See generally Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception
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lawsuits against individual consumers is now the stuff of legend. The
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) announced on
November 4, 2004, it would launch its massive litigation campaign
against individual consumers. 320  Owners keep complaining about the
massive costs of filing lawsuits against individuals, yet they continue
filing these lawsuits. Individual lawsuits are much more efficient than
the content industries make them out to be. 3 2  First, very few P2P users
upload the vast majority of files available for downloading. Only 3% of
users upload 97% of files available on P2P networks.322 This anomaly
increases the efficiency of individual lawsuits by maximizing the gains
from a minimal amount of lawsuits. The RIAA took advantage of this
anomaly by focusing its individual lawsuits on consumers "who on
average have allegedly distributed over 1000 copyrighted music files
unlawfully., 323  Second, digital technologies keep detailed records of
infringing actions committed by individuals; it is not at all difficult to
find them.
324
Moreover, the entertainment industry's claims of significant
financial losses because of piracy keep losing credibility. When
companies experience financial difficulties, consumers can see objective
proof. Employees lose their jobs, facilities shut down, and the company
undergoes financial cuts. All these elements are missing in the
entertainment industry. Why are firms not cutting the exorbitant
contracts of star actors and singers? After all, if the value of copyrighted
works is in fact decreasing, the value of contracts to create these works
should also decrease. Where are the job cuts? Again, if value is truly
going down, this reduction should be reflected in cutting production
costs. None of these signs of financial difficulty are in effect, and once
again, the entertainment industry keeps filing more lawsuits against
individuals. All of these factors point against actual financial losses
incurred by the entertainment industry, and more importantly, they point
against any need for extended secondary liability.
of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital
Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 101 (2002/2003) (arguing that reduction of CD sales
in the music industry was more a result of the 2000 bear market rather than the popularity
of Napster).
320. Press Release, Studios to Begin Suing Illegal Film File Swappers (Nov. 4, 2004),
available at http://www.mpaa.org/CurrentReleases (last visited 11/20/04).
321. Lemley & Reese, supra note 150, at 1399-1400.
322. Id. at 1399 (citing Matt Bai, Hating Hilary, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 95, 97,
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l 1.02/hating.html (last visited
11/20/04)).
323. Id. at 1399 n.220 (citing Michael Warnecke, Record Labels Sue 261 "Major
Offenders" for Alleged Unlawful Online File-Swapping, 66 PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 545 (2003)).
324. Id. at 1391-92.
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On the flipside, consumers have warned against the overprotection
of copyright and the aggressive litigation strategies of owners. They
caution that innovators will go bankrupt in the face of this litigation.
Objective proof exists of these concerns, as was the case with ReplayTV
4000.325 Putting it together, the content industry is missing the objective
proof of its financial losses due to infringement, while consumers have
objective proof of innovators going bankrupt due to the onslaught of
litigation by the content industry. Once this proof is combined with the
twin policies of copyright to promote new works and innovative
mediums, copyright owners should justly incur a greater burden when
seeking to extend liability to innovative mediums.
X. Conclusion
Digital technology is exciting. Innovations in the near future are
going to carry us to levels of communication and consumer autonomy we
never imagined. Proper measures must be taken to safeguard these
innovations. Inevitably, any innovation will cause at least a short-term
depletion in the value of copyrighted works. But as long as owners can
still achieve adequate returns on their investments, a depletion in value
alone is not a justifiable reason to stifle innovation completely. The
innovative medium defense will provide a fair analysis to determine the
legality of innovative mediums. With this proper balance, copyright will
promote, rather than stifle, innovation, and we can witness the full
benefits of digital technology.
325. See discussion supra Part VIII.
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